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Abstract—Smart contracts are programs running on a
blockchain. They are immutable to patch for bugs once deployed
– it is critical to ensure they are bug-free and well-designed
before deploying. Code smells are symptoms in source code
that possibly indicate deeper problems. The detection of code
smells is a method to avoid potential bugs and improve the
design of existing code. However, traditional code smell patterns
are designed for centralized OO programs, e.g., Java or C++;
while smart contracts are decentralized and contain numerous
distinctive features, such as the gas system. To fill this gap, we
collected smart-contract-related posts from Stack Exchange, as
well as real-world smart contracts. We manually analyzed these
posts and defined 20 kinds of code smells for smart contracts.
We categorized these into security, architecture, and usability
problems. To validate if practitioners consider these contract
smells as harmful, we created an online survey and received 96
responses from 24 different countries. Feedback showed these
code smells are harmful and removing them would improve
quality and robustness of smart contracts. We manually identified
our defined code smells in 587 contract accounts and publicly
released our dataset. Finally, we summarized 5 impacts caused
by contract code smells. These help developers better understand
the symptoms of the smells and removal priority.
I. INTRODUCTION
The considerable success of decentralized cryptocurrencies
has attracted great attention from both industry and academia.
Bitcoin [35] and Ethereum [27], [44] are the two most pop-
ular cryptocurrencies whose global market cap reached $162
billion by April 2018 [3]. Blockchain is the underlying tech-
nology of cryptocurrencies, which runs a consensus protocol
to maintain a shared ledger to secure the data on blockchain.
Both Bitcoin and Ethereum allow users to encode rules or
scripts for processing transactions. However, scripts on Bitcoin
are not Turing-complete, which restrict the scenarios of its
usage. Unlike Bitcoin, Ethereum provides a more advanced
technology named Smart Contracts.
Smart contracts are Turing-complete programs that run on
the blockchain, in which consensus protocol ensures their
correct execution [27]. With the assistance of smart contracts,
developers can apply blockchain techniques to different fields
like gaming and finance. When developers deploy smart
contracts to Ethereum, the source code of contracts will be
compiled into bytecode and reside on the blockchain. Once
a smart contract is created, it is identified by a 160-bit hex-
adecimal address, and anyone can invoke this smart contract
by sending transactions to the corresponding contract address.
Ethereum uses Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) to execute
smart contracts and transaction are stored on its blockchain.
However, a blockchain ensures that all data on it is im-
mutable, i.e., cannot be modified, which means that smart
contracts cannot be patched when bugs are detected or feature
additions are desired. In contrast to classical distributed appli-
cations, smart contracts on Ethereum operate on a permission-
less network. Arbitrary developers even attackers can call the
methods to execute the contracts. The famous DAO attack [4]
made the DAO (Decentralized Autonomous Organization) lost
3.6 million Ethers ($150/Ether on Feb 2019), which caused a
controversial hard fork [10], [?] of Ethereum.
It is thus critical to ensure that smart contracts are bug-free
and well-designed before deploying them to the blockchain.
In software engineering, code smells are the symptoms in the
source code that possibly indicate deeper problems [40]. Code
smells are related to not only security issues but also design
flaws which might slow down development or increase the risk
of bugs or failures in the future. Detecting and refactoring out
code smells helps increase software robustness and enhance
development efficiency [42], [31].
There are many code smell detection tools [11], [12], [16],
[15] which have been widely applied in industry. However,
these tools are designed for traditional centralized software
based on 22 code smells defined by Martin et al. [28]. These
traditional code smells are not enough for the decentralized
smart contracts due to their revolutionary new features, such as
gas system and decentralized feature. For example, the number
one code smell in the stink parade is duplicated code [28].
To remove the duplicated code in two unrelated classes, the
standard method is extracting duplicated code in one class
and then use the new component in the other classes. This
method removes this code smell in traditional software and
makes programs easier to read. However, for smart contracts,
calling functions of other smart contracts is ”gas-consuming”
and can lead to an economic loss.
In this paper, we conduct an empirical study on defining
code smells for smart contracts on Ethereum which is the
most popular decentralized platform that runs smart contracts.
Please note that some previous works [33], [36], [30] focus
on improving the quality of smart contracts from the security
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aspect, but this is the first paper which aims to provide
a systematic study of code smells from three aspects (i.e.,
security, architecture and usability). Our results are conducted
from 17,128 Ethereum.Stack Exchange1 posts and have been
validated by an online survey. To help developers better
understand the symptoms and distribution of smart contract
code smells, we manually labeled a dataset and released it
publicly to help further study. In this paper, we address the
following research questions:
RQ1: What are the code smells in smart contracts?
We defined 20 code smells from Stack Exchange posts and
real-world smart contracts. These 20 kinds of code smells are
considered from security, architecture and usability aspects.
By removing the defined code smells on the contracts, it is
likely to improve the quality and robustness of the programs.
RQ2: How do practitioners perceive the code smells we
identify?
To validate the acceptance of our newly defined smart
contract code smells, we conducted an online survey and
received 96 responses and 62 comments from developers in 24
countries. The options in the survey are from ’Very important’
to ’Very unimportant’ and we give each option a score from 5
to 1, respectively. The average score of each code smell is 4.28.
The feedbacks and comments show that developers believe
removing the defined code smells can improve the quality and
robustness of smart contracts.
RQ3: What are the distributions and impacts of the code
smells in real-world smart contracts?
We manually labeled 2,522 smart contracts on 587 contract
accounts. We found that more than 99% of smart contracts
contain at least one of our defined code smells. Besides, we
summarized 5 impacts that can help researchers and developers
better understand the symptoms of these code smells.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• We define 20 code smells for smart contracts considering
three aspects: security, architecture, and usability. We list
symptoms and give a code example of each code smell,
which can help developers better understand the defined
code smells.
• We manually identify whether the defined 20 code smells
exist in real-life smart contracts. Our dataset2 contains a
collection of 2,522 smart contracts on 587 contract ac-
counts, which can assist future studies on smart contract
analysis and testing. Also, we analyze the impacts of the
defined code smells and summarize 5 common impacts.
These impacts can help developers decide the priority of
code smell removal.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we provide background knowledge of smart contracts.
In Sections 3-5, we present the answers to the three research
questions, respectively. We discuss the implications and threats
to validity in Section 6. Finally, we elaborate the related work
1https://ethereum.stackexchange.com/
2The dataset can be downloaded at
https://github.com/CodeSmell2019/CodeSmell.
in Section 7, and conclude the whole study and mention future
work in Section 8.
II. BACKGROUND
Smart Contract - A Decentralized Program. A smart
contract is ”a computerized transaction protocol that executes
the terms of contract” [39]. Their bytecode and transactions
are all stored on the blockchain and visible to all the users.
Since Ethereum is an add-only distribute ledger, once smart
contracts are deployed to a blockchain, they are immutable
to be modified even when bugs are detected. Once a smart
contract is created, it is identified by a unique 160-bit hexadec-
imal string referred to as its contact address. The executions
of smart contracts depend on their code. For example, if a
contract does not contain functions that can transfer Ethers,
even the creator can not withdraw the Ethers. Once smart
contracts are deployed, they will exist as long as the whole
network exists unless they execute selfdestruct function [22].
selfdestruct is a function that if it is executed, the contract
will disappear and its balance will transfer to a specific
address. In this paper, we describe smart contracts developed
using Solidity, the most popular smart contract programming
language in Ethereum.
The Gas System. In Ethereum, miners run smart contracts on
their machines. As compensation for miners who contribute
their computing resources, the creators and users of smart
contracts will pay a certain amount of Ethers to the miners.
The Ethers that are paid to miners are computed by: gas cost *
gas price. Gas cost depends on the computational resource the
transaction will take and gas price is offered by the transaction
creators. The minimum unit of gas price is Wei (1 Ether = 1018
Wei). The miners have the right to choose which transaction
can be executed and broadcasted to the other nodes on the
blockchain [44]. Therefore, if the gas price is too low, the
transactions may not be executed. Besides, to limit the gas
cost, when a user sends a transaction to invoke a contract,
there will be a limit (Gas Limit) that determines the maximum
gas cost. If the gas cost exceeds the Gas Limit, the execution
is terminated with an exception often referred to as out-of-gas
error.
Data location. In smart contracts, data can be stored in
storage, memory or calldata [22]. storage is a persistent
memory area to store data. For each storage variable, EVM
will assign a storage slot ID to identify it. Writing and reading
storage variable is the most expensive operation as compared
with reading from the other two locations. The second memory
area is named memory. The data of the memory variables will
be released after their life cycle finished. Writing and reading
to memory is cheaper than storage. Calldata is only valid for
parameters of external contract functions. Reading data from
the Calldata is much cheaper than memory or storage.
Fallback Function. The fallback function [22] is the only
unnamed function in Ethereum. This function cannot have
arguments or return values. It is only executed when an error
function call happens. For example, a user calls function ”A”
TABLE I
CLASSIFICATION SCHEME.
Category Description
Gas Limitation Bugs caused by gas limitation.
Permission Check Bugs caused by permission check failure.
Inappropriate
Logic
There are inappropriate logics inside a contract,
which can be utilized by attackers.
Specialized DApp
Features
Developers do not realize there are some differences
between traditional apps with DApps, for example,
Ethereum does not support concurrency, so they
make mistakes.
Version Gaps Errors due to the update of Ethereum or Solidity.
Inappropriate Stan-
dard
Ethereum provides several standards, but many con-
tracts do not follow them.
but the callee contract does not contain this function. The
fallback function will be executed to handle the error call.
Also, if a fallback function is marked by payable3, it will be
executed automatically when the contract receives Ethers. It is
worth noting that transfer and send4 functions will limit the
gas of fallback function in callee contracts to 2300 gas [22].
This gas is not enough to write to storage, call functions or
send Ethers.
III. RQ1: CODE SMELLS IN SMART CONTRACTS
A. Motivation
Smart contracts cannot be patched after deploying them to
the blockchain. Removing code smells in programs is a good
way to ensure their robustness. As we mentioned in Section
1, the revolutionary new features made traditional code smells
not enough for decentralized smart contracts. To fill this gap,
we define code smells from Stack Exchange posts. We give
definitions and examples of defined code smells specialized
for Ethereum smart contracts.
B. Approach
Stack Exchange Posts: To define code smells for smart con-
tracts, we collected issues that developers encountered. Pro-
grammers often collaborate and share experience over Q&A
site like Ethereum Stack Exchange [9], the most popular and
widely-used question and answer site for users of Ethereum.
By analyzing posts on Ethereum Stack Exchange, we can
summarize code smells on Ethereum. In this paper, we crawled
17,128 Stack Exchange posts and analyzed them further. How-
ever, it is time-consuming to find important information from
thousands of Q&A posts. Therefore, we utilized keywords to
filter important information from Stack Exchange posts. To
ensure the completeness of our keywords list, two authors of
this paper read the solidity documents carefully and recorded
the keywords they think are important (These keywords are
also published). After that, they merged the keywords list and
used these keywords to filter Stack Exchange posts. When
reading the posts, we added new keywords to enrich our list
and filter new posts. We finally used 66 keywords to filter
4,141 posts.
Open Card Sorting : We followed the card sorting [38] ap-
proach to analyze and categorize the filtered posts. We created
one card for each post. The card contains the information of
3If a function wants to receive Ethers, it has to add payable
4In solidity, transfer and send functions are used to send Ethers to another
smart contract.
its title, body, and comments. Two authors of this paper who
have rich experience in smart contract development worked
together to figure out the labels of posts. The detailed steps
are:
Iteration 1: We randomly chose 20% of the cards, and two
authors discussed their root cause. If the root causes of the
posts are unclear, we omitted them from our card sort. All the
themes are generated during the sorting.
Iteration 2: Two authors independently categorized the
remaining 80% cards into the initial classification scheme. We
found Inappropriate Standard are common in the remaining
card, and we finally categorized 6 themes, the detailed infor-
mation is shown in Table I. We used Cohen’s Kappa [25] to
measure the agreement between the two authors. Their overall
Kappa value is 0.82, indicating strong agreement.
Definition: After categorizing the filtered posts, we summa-
rized 6 high-level root causes from Stack Exchange post. Then,
two authors of this paper read the posts on each categorizing
again, and aim to find more detail behaviors as the definition
of code smells. Finally, we summarized 16 code smells.
Following are two examples:
Example 1: Nested Call
Post Example: ”Too much gas consumption ... This method
can be executed with around 500k gas ... ”.
Defining Process: The post belongs to ’Gas Limitation’. It
describes one’s smart contract has a very high gas consump-
tion. We carefully analyzed the code example given by the
post and found that it executes CALL instruction inside a for
loop who does not limit its length. Since the times of iterations
are unlimited, it causes an out-of-gas error. Finally, we give
definition Nest Call as ’Executing CALL instruction inside an
unlimited-length loop.’
Example 2: High Gas Consumption Function Type
Post Example: ”What are the best practices of using
external vs. public keyword? ... public functions are expensive
... ”
Defining Process: The post belongs to ’Specialized DApp
Features’ because the keyword ’external’ is a new feature in
Solidity compared to the traditional programming language
like Java or C++. The post asks the difference between external
and public functions. The answer explains that the biggest
difference is that ’public’ requires more gas compared to ’ex-
ternal’. So, we defined a code smell ’High Gas Consumption
Function Type’ as ’Using inappropriate function type which
can increase gas consumption’.
Besides, to assist future studies on smart contract analysis
and testing, we identified whether the defined code smells exist
in these 2,522 real-world smart contracts from 587 contract
addresses. We first crawled all 72,723 open-sourced smart
contracts from 17,013 contract accounts with Ethereum. We
randomly chose smart contracts on 600 contract accounts.
Then, we filtered smart contracts on 13 contract accounts
because they do not contain any functions in their contracts.
Finally, we obtain 2,522 smart contracts with 231,098 lines
of code from the 587 contract accounts. The total amount
TABLE II
DEFINITIONS OF THE 20 CODE SMELLS.
Code Smell Definition Code Smell Definition
Unchecked External Calls Do not check the return value of external call functions. DoS Under External Influ-
ence
Throwing exceptions inside a loop which can be influ-
enced by external users
Strict Balance Equality Using strict balance quality to determine the execute
logic.
Unmatched Type Assign-
ment
Assigning unmatched type to a value, which can lead to
integer overflow
Transaction State Depen-
dency
Using tx.origin to check the permission. Re-entrancy The re-entrancy bugs.
Hard Code Address Using hard code address inside smart contracts. Block Info Dependency Using block information related APIs to determine the
execute logic.
Nested Call Executing CALL instruction inside an unlimited-length
loop.
Deprecated APIs Using discarded or unrecommended AIPs or instructions.
Unspecified Compiler Ver-
sion
Do not fix the smart contract to a specific version. Misleading Data Location Do not clarify the reference types of local variables of
struct, array or mapping.
Unused Statement Creating values which never be used. Unmatched ERC-20 stan-
dard
Do not follow the ERC-20 standard for ICO contracts.
Missing Return Statement A function denote the type of return values but do not
return anything.
Missing Interrupter Missing backdoor mechanism in order to handle emer-
gencies.
Missing Reminder Missing events to notify caller whether some functions
are successfully executed.
Greedy Contract A contract can receive Ethers but can not withdraw
Ethers.
High Gas Consumption
Function Type
Using inappropriate function type which can increase gas
consumption.
High Gas Consumption
Data Type
Using inappropriate data type which can increase gas
consumption.
of Ethers in these accounts are more than 4 million Ethers.
During the process of labeling, we found another 4 code smells
which are common in real-world smart contracts. Finally, we
defined 20 code smells.
C. Results
We define and give examples of each smell from the three
categories, i.e., Security Smells, Architecture Smells, Usability
Smells. We first give a brief definition of each code smells in
Table II. Then, we give detailed definitions and code examples
in the followed paragraphs:
1) Security Smell: In this subsection, we identify 7 code
smells that can lead to security issues. These may be exploited
by attackers to gain financial benefits or attack vulnerable
contracts.
(1) Unchecked External Calls: To transfer Ethers or
call functions of other smart contracts, Solidity provides a
series of external call functions for raw addresses, i.e., ad-
dress.send(), address.call(), address.delegatecall() [22]. Un-
fortunately, these methods may fail due to network errors
or out-of-gas error, e.g., the 2300 gas limitation of fallback
function introduced in Section II. When errors happen, these
methods will return a boolean value (False), but never throw
an exception. If callers do not check return values of external
calls, they cannot ensure whether code logic is correct.
Example: An example of this code smell is given in Listing
1. In function getWinner (L21), the contract does not check
the return value of send (L24), but the array participators is
emptied by assigning participatorID to 0 (L25). In this case,
if the send method failed, the winner will lose 8 Ethers.
(2) DoS Under External Influence: When an exception
is detected, the smart contract will rollback the transaction.
However, throwing exceptions inside a loop is dangerous.
Example: In line 31 of Listing 1, the contract uses transfer
to send Ethers. However, In Solidity, transfer and send will
limit the gas of fallback function in callee contracts to 2,300
gas [22]. This gas is not enough to write to storage, call
functions or send Ethers. If one of member[i] is an attacker
contract and the transfer function (L31) can trigger an out-
of-gas exception due to the 2,300 gas limitation. Then, the
contract state will rollback. Since the code cannot be modified,
the contract can not remove the attack address from members
list, which means that if the attacker does not stop attacking,
no one can get bonus anymore.
(3) Strict Balance Equality: Attackers can send Ethers to
any contracts forcibly by utilizing selfdestruct(victim address)
API [22]. This way will not trigger the fallback function,
meaning the victim contract cannot reject the Ethers. There-
fore, the equation logic of contract balance will fail to work
due to the unexpected ethers send by attackers.
Example: Attackers can send 1 Wei (1 Ether = 1018 Wei) to
Contract Gamble in Listing 1 by utilizing selfdestruct method.
This method will not trigger fallback function (L11). Thus, the
Ethers will not be thrown by ReceiveEth(L13). If this attack
happens, the getWinner() (L21) would never be executed,
because the getWinner can only be executed when the balance
of the contract is strictly equal to 10 Ethers(L19).
1 c o n t r a c t Gamble{
2 a d d r e s s owner ;
3 a d d r e s s [ ] members ;
4 a d d r e s s [ ] p a r t i c i p a t o r s ;
5 u i n t p a r t i c i p a t o r I D = 0 ;
6 m o d i f i e r onlyOwner{ /∗ T r a n s a c t i o n S t a t e Dependency
∗ /
7 r e q u i r e ( t x . o r i g i n ==owner ) ; ; }
8 f u n c t i o n c o n s t r u c t o r ( ) { / / c o n s t r u c t o r f u n c t i o n
9 owner = / / t h i s i s t h e a d d r e s s o f t x . o r i g i n
10 0xdCad . . . d1D3AD ; /∗Hard Code Address ∗ /}
11 f u n c t i o n ( ) p a y a b l e { / / Execu ted when r e c e i v i n g
E t h e r s
12 R e c e i v e E t h ( ) ;}
13 f u n c t i o n R e c e i v e E t h ( ) p a y a b l e {
14 i f ( msg . v a l u e !=1 e t h e r ) {
15 r e v e r t ( ) ; } / / msg . v a l u e i s t h e number o f r e c e i v e d
ETHs
16 members . push ( msg . s e n d e r ) ;
17 p a r t i c i p a t o r s [ p a r t i c i p a t o r I D ] = msg . s e n d e r ;
18 p a r t i c i p a t o r I D ++;
19 i f ( t h i s . b a l a n c e ==10 e t h e r ) { /∗ S t r i c t Ba l ance
E q u a l i t y ∗ /
20 ge tWinner ( ) ;}}
21 f u n c t i o n ge tWinner ( ) { / / choose a member t o be t h e
winner
22 /∗ Block I n f o Dependency ∗ /
23 u i n t winnerID = u i n t ( b l o c k . b l o c k h a s h ( b l o c k . number
) ) % p a r t i c i p a t o r s . l e n g t h ;
24 p a r t i c i p a t o r s [ winnerID ] . send (8 e t h e r ) ;
25 p a r t i c i p a t o r I D = 0 ;}
26 f u n c t i o n giveBonus ( ) r e t u r n s ( boo l ) { / / send 0 . 1 ETH
t o a l l members a s bonus
27 /∗Unmatched Type Assignment , Nes ted C a l l ∗ /
28 f o r ( v a r i = 0 ; i < members . l e n g t h ; i ++){
29 i f ( t h i s . b a l a n c e > 0 . 1 e t h e r )
30 /∗DoS Under E x t e r n a l I n f l u e n c e ∗ /
31 members [ i ] . t r a n s f e r ( 0 . 1 e t h e r ) ; }
32 /∗Miss ing R e t u r n S t a t e m e n t ∗ / }
33 f u n c t i o n s u i c i d e ( a d d r e s s add r ) onlyOwner{ / / Remove
t h e c o n t r a c t from b l o c k c h a i n
34 s e l f d e s t r u c t ( add r ) ;}
35 f u n c t i o n withDraw ( u i n t amount ) onlyOwner{ / /
wi thdraw c e r t a i n E t h e r s t o owner a c c o u n t
36 a d d r e s s r e c e i v e r = 0 x05f4 . . . d27 ;
37 r e c e i v e r . c a l l . v a l u e ( amount ) ;}}
Listing 1. A ”Gamble” smart contract. Each gambler sends 1 Ether to this
contract. When the contract receives 10 Ethers, it chooses one gambler as the
winner and sends 8 Ethers to him. However, this contract contains several
code smells.
(4) Unmatched Type Assignment: Solidity supports dif-
ferent types of integers (e.g., uint8, uint256). The default type
of integer is uint256 which supports a range from 0 to 2
ˆ 256. uint8 takes less memory, but only supports numbers
from 0 to 2ˆ8. Solidity will not throw an exception when a
value exceeds its maximum value. The progressive increase
is a common operation in programming, and performing an
increment operation without checking the maximum value may
lead to overflow.
Example: The variable i in line 28 of Listing 1 is assigned
to uint8, because 0 is in range of uint8 (0-255). If the
members.length is larger than 255, the value of i after 255
is 0. Thus, the loop will not stop until running out of gas or
balance of account is less than 0.1.
(5) Transaction State Dependency: Contracts need to
check whether the caller has permissions in some functions
like suicide (L33 in Listing 1). The failure of permission
checks can cause serious consequences. For example, if some-
one passes the permission check of suicide function, he/she
can destroy the contract and stole all the Ethers. tx.origin can
get the original address that kicked off the transaction, but
this method is not reliable since the address returned by this
method depends on the transaction state.
Example: We can find this smell in line 7 of Listing 1.
The contract uses tx.origin to check whether the caller has
permission to execute function suicide. However, if an attacker
uses function attack in Listing 4 to call suicide function (L33
in Listing 1), the permission check will fail. suicide function
will check whether the sender has permission to execute this
function. However, the address obtained by tx.origin is always
the address who creates this contract (0xdCad...d1D3AD L10
in Listing 1). Therefore, anyone can execute the suicide
function and withdraw all of the Ethers in the contract.
(6) Block Info Dependency: Ethereum provides a set of
APIs (e.g., block.blockhash, block.timestamp) to help smart
contracts obtain block related information, like timestamps
or hash number. Many contracts use these pieces of block
information to execute some operations. However, the miner
can influence block information; for example, miners can vary
block time stamp by roughly 900 seconds [2]. In other words,
block info dependency operation can be controlled by miners
to some extent.
Example: In Listing 1 line 23, the contract uses blockhash
to generate which member is the winner. However, the gamble
is not fair because miners can manipulate this operation.
(7) Re-entrancy: Concurrency is an important feature of
traditional software. However, Solidity does not support it,
and the functions of a smart contract can be interrupted while
running. Solidity allows parallel external invocations using call
method. If the callee contract does not correctly manage the
global state, the callee contract will be attacked – called a
re-entrancy attack.
Example: Listing 2 shows an example of re-entrancy.
The attacker contract invokes Victim contract’s withDraw()
function. However, Victim contract sends Ethers to attacker
contract before resetting the balance. Line 6 will invoke the
fallback function (L9) of attacker contract and lead to repeated
invocation.
1 c o n t r a c t Vic t im {
2 mapping ( a d d r e s s => u i n t ) p u b l i c u s e r B a l a n n c e ;
3 f u n c t i o n withDraw ( ) {
4 u i n t amount = u s e r B a l a n n c e [ msg . s e n d e r ] ;
5 i f ( amount > 0){
6 msg . s e n d e r . c a l l . v a l u e ( amount ) ( ) ;
7 u s e r B a l a n n c e [ msg . s e n d e r ] = 0;}} . . . }
8 c o n t r a c t A t t a c k e r {
9 f u n c t i o n ( ) p a y a b l e {
10 Vic t im ( msg . s e n d e r ) . withDraw ( ) ;}
11 f u n c t i o n r e e n t r a n c y ( a d d r e s s add r ) {
12 Vic t im ( add r ) . withDraw ( ) ;} . . . }
Listing 2. Attacker contract can attack Victim contract by utilizing Re-
entrancy
1 pragma s o l i d i t y ˆ 0 . 4 . 2 5 ; / ∗ U n s p e c i f i e d Compi le r
V e r s i o n ∗ /
2 c o n t r a c t SmellExample{
3 u i n t v a r i a b l e ;
4 u i n t [ ] i n v e s t L i s t ;
5 f u n c t i o n ( ) p a y a b l e {}
6 f u n c t i o n r e A s s i g n A r r a y ( ) {
7 /∗M i s l e a d i n g Data L o c a t i o n ∗ /
8 u i n t [ ] tmp ;
9 tmp . push ( 0 ) ;
10 i n v e s t L i s t = tmp ;}
11 f u n c t i o n c h a n g e V a r i a b l e ( u i n t va lue1 , u i n t v a l u e 2
) {
12 /∗Unused S t a t e m e n t ∗ /
13 u i n t newValue = v a l u e 1 ;
14 v a r i a b l e = v a l u e 2 ;}
15 /∗High Gas Consumption F u n c t i o n Type ∗ /
16 f u n c t i o n highGas ( u i n t [ 2 0 ] a ) p u b l i c r e t u r n s (
u i n t ) {
17 r e t u r n a [ 1 0 ]∗2 ;}
18 f u n c t i o n lowGas ( u i n t [ 2 0 ] a ) e x t e r n a l r e t u r n s (
u i n t ) {
19 r e t u r n a [ 1 0 ]∗2 ;}}
Listing 3. SmellExample
1 c o n t r a c t a t t a c k e r {
2 . . .
3 f u n c t i o n a t t a c k ( a d d r e s s addr , a d d r e s s myAddr ) {
4 Gamble gamble = Gamble ( add r ) ;
5 gamble . s u i c i d e ( myAddr ) ;}}
Listing 4. An attacker contract by utilizing Transaction State Dependency
smell.
2) Architecture Smell: We define 6 code smells related to
architecture. These may not be utilized by attackers but are
a bad design for contracts and reduce their readability and
maintainability, or lead to unpredicted vulnerabilities in the
future.
(1) Hard Coded Address: Since we cannot modify smart
contracts after deploying them, hard coded addresses can lead
to vulnerabilities.
Example: There are two main kinds of errors this code
smell can lead to. The first is Illegal Address. Ethereum uses
a mixed-case address checksum to verify whether an address
is legal or not. The rule is defined in EIP-55 [8]. There is an
error address in line 10 of Listing 1. The owner address is an
illegal address, the last bit of the address should be ’F’, but
by mistake, it becomes ’D’. The illegal address makes no one
that can withdraw the amount of this contract. The second is
Suicide Address. selfdestruct function (L34) can remove the
code from the blockchain and make the contract become a
suicide contract, but it is potentially dangerous. If someone
sends Ether to suicide contracts, the Ether will forever be lost.
receiver (L36) is a smart contract who contains selfdestruct
function. Its address is hardcoded in line 36 of Listing 1 and
cannot be modified. If the receiver performed the selfdestruct
function, it will become a suicide contract. All the Ethers send
to receiver will be lost forever.
(2) Nested Call: Instruction CALL is very expensive (9000
gas paid for a non-zero value transfer as part of the CALL
operation [44]). If a loop body contains CALL operation but
does not limit the number of times the loop is executed, the
total gas cost would have a high probability of exceeding the
gas limitation because the number of iterations may be high
and it is hard to know its upper limit.
Example: In Listing 1, the function giveBonus (line 26) uses
transfer (L31) which generates CALL to send Ethers. Since the
members.length (L28) do not limit its size, giveBonus has a
probability to cause out of gas error. When this error happens,
this function can not be called anymore because there is no
way to reduce the members.length.
(3) Deprecated APIs: Some instructions will be modified
or discarded after hard forks. As Solidity is a young and
evolving programming language, some APIs/instructions will
be discarded or updated in the future. If developers use these
APIs, they need to refactor the code, leading to resource waste.
Example: CALLCODE operation will be discarded in the
future [22], throw, suicide, sha3 are replaced by revert, self-
destruct, keccak256 respectively in the recent version.
(4) Unspecified Compiler Version: Different versions of
Solidity may contain different APIs/instructions(Deprecated
APIs code smells described before). In Solidity programming,
developers should indicate the compiler version.
Example: In the first line of Listing 3, pragma solidity
ˆ 0.4.25 means that this contract supports compile version
0.4.25 and above (except for v0.5.0) while pragma solidity
0.4.25 means that the contract only supports compile version
0.4.25. Since it is hard to foresee the language constructions
in the future version, it is recommended to indicate a specific
compiler version to avoid unnecessary bugs.
(5) Misleading Data Location: In traditional programming
languages like Java or C, variables created inside a function
are local variables. Data is stored in memory and the memory
will be released after the function exits. In Solidity, the data
of struct, mapping, arrays are stored in storage even they are
created inside a function. However, since storage in solidity is
not dynamically allocated, storage variables created inside a
function will point to the storage slot5 0 by default [22]. This
can cause unpredictable bugs.
Example: Function reAssignArray (L6) in Listing 3 creates
a local variable tmp. The default data location of tmp is
storage, but EVM cannot allocate storage dynamically. There
is no space for tmp, but instead, it will point to the storage slot
0 (variable in L3 of Listing 3). For the result, once function
reAssignArray is called, the variable variable will add 1, which
can cause bugs for the contract.
(6) Unused Statement: If function parameters or local
variables do not affect any contract statements nor return a
value, it is better to remove these to improve code readability.
Example: function parameter value1 and local variable
newValue in function changeVariable (L11 of Listing 3) are
useless, because they never affect contract statements nor
return values. Although the compiler will remove these useless
statements when compiling source code to binary code, these
can reduce contract readability.
3) Usability Smell: We define 7 code smells related to
usability. Removing usability code smells can reduce cost and
avoid unnecessary errors when others call contracts.
(1) Unmatched ERC-20 Standard: ERC-20 Token Stan-
dard [5] is a technical standard on Ethereum for implementing
tokens of cryptocurrencies. It defines a standard list of rules
for Ethereum tokens to follow within the larger Ethereum
ecosystem, allowing developers to predict the interaction be-
tween tokens accurately. These rules include how the tokens
are transferred between addresses and how data within each
token is accessed. The function name, parameter types and
return value should strictly follow the ERC20 standard. ERC-
20 defines 9 different functions and 2 events to ensure the
tokens based on ERC20 can easily be exchanged with other
ERC20 tokens. However, we find that many smart contracts
miss return values or miss some functions.
Example: transfer and transferFrom are two functions
defined by ERC20. They are used to transfer tokens from one
account to another. ERC20 defines that these two functions
have to return a boolean value, but many smart contracts miss
this return value, leading to errors when transferring tokens.
(2) Missing Return Statement: Some functions denote
return values but do not return anything. For these, EVM
will add a default return value when compiling the code to
bytecode. Since the callers may not know the source code of
the callee contract, they may use the return value to handle
code execution and lead to unpredictable bugs.
5Each storage variables has its own storage slot to identify its position.
Example: Function giveBonus (L26) in Listing 1 declares
the return type bool, but the function does not return true or
false. Then, EVM will assign the default return value as false.
If developers call this function, the return value will always
be the false and some functions in the caller contracts may
never be executed.
(3) Missing Interrupter: When bugs are detected by
attackers, they can attack the contracts and steal their Ethers.
The DAO lost $50 million Ethers due to a bug in the code
that allowed an attacker to draw off the Ethers [4] repeatedly.
The interrupter is a mechanism to stop the contract when bugs
are detected. We cannot modify contracts after deploying them
to the blockchain. However, if a contract contains interrupter,
the owner of the victim contract can reduce their losses. The
easiest interrupter is adding a selfdestruct function [22], Ethers
on the contracts can be withdrawn and the contracts destroyed.
Example: When bugs are found in Listing 1, the Ethers
on the contract can be stolen by attackers. Fortunately, the
contract contains an interrupter on suicide function (L33). So,
the owner of the contract can call suicide. Then, the remain
Ethers will send to the given address. After fixing the bugs,
the contracts can be redeployed.
(4) Missing Reminder: Other programs can call smart
contracts through the contracts’ Application Binary Interface
(ABI). ABI is the standard way to interact with contracts in
the Ethereum ecosystem, both from outside the blockchain and
for contract-to-contract interaction. However, callers do not
know the source code of the contracts unless the contracts are
open source. Callers usually do not know detailed information
about functions. Throwing an event to notify caller whether
the function is successfully executed can reduce unnecessary
errors and gas waste.
Example: A typical scenario of this code smell is missing
reminders when receiving Ethers. In Listing 1, users may
not clear the game rules, and send Ethers which not equal
to 1 Ether (line 14, 15). However, the smart contract will
check whether the received Ether is equal to 1 Ether, then the
Ether will return back. There are several reasons for invoking
failures. For example, the user may mistakenly believe the
error is caused by network and resend the Ethers, which can
lead to gas waste. Adding reminders (throwing events) to
notify caller whether some functions are successfully executed
can avoid unnecessary failure.
(5) Greedy Contract: A contract can withdraw Ethers
by sending Ethers to another address or using selfdesturct
function. Without these withdraw-related functions, Ethers in
contracts can never be withdrawn and will be locked forever.
We define a contract to be a greedy contract if the contract can
receive ethers (contains payable fallback function) but there is
no way to withdraw them.
Example: In Listing 3, the contract has a payable fallback
function in line 5, which means this contracts can receive
Ethers. However, the contracts cannot send Ethers to other
contracts or addresses. Therefore, the Ethers in this contract
will be locked forever.
(6) High Gas Consumption Function Type: For public
functions, Solidity immediately copies function arguments
(Arrays) to memory, while external functions can read directly
from calldata [44]. Memory allocation is expensive, whereas
reading from calldata is cheap. To lower gas consumption,
if there are no internal functions call this function and the
function parameters contain array, it is recommended to use
external instead of public.
Example: In Listing 3, function highGas (L16) and function
lowGas (L18) have the same capabilities. The only difference
is that highGas is modified by public which can be called by
external and internal functions. lowGas is modified by external
which can only be called by external. Calling function highGas
costs 496 gas while calling lowGas only costs 261 gas.
(7) High Gas Consumption Data Type: bytes is
dynamically-sized byte array in Solidity, byte[] is similar
with bytes, but bytes cost less gas than byte[] because it is
packed tightly in calldata. EVM operates on 32 bytes a time,
byte[] always occupy multiples of 32 bytes which means great
space is wasted but not for bytes. Therefore, bytes takes less
storage and costs less gas. To lower gas consumption, it is
recommended to use bytes instead of byte[].
Example: Replacing byte[] by bytes can save a small
amount of gas for each function call. However, as the contract
is called more times, a large amount of gas can potentially be
saved.
IV. RQ2: PRACTITIONERS’ PERSPECTIVE
A. Motivation
In Section III, we gave the definition of 20 code smells.
To validate our defined code smells are harmful, we created
an online survey to collect opinions from real-world smart
contract developers.
B. Approach
1) Validation Survey: We followed the instructions of
Kitchenham et al. [32] for personal opinion surveys and
utilized an anonymous survey [41] to increase response rates.
Respondents can choose to leave an email address, as all
respondents could choose to take part in a raffle to win two $50
Amazon gift cards. We first conducted a small scale survey to
polish our questions. These participators give feedback about:
(1) whether the expression of the code smells is clear and easy
to understand, and (2) whether the length of each question
is suitable. Finally, we modified our survey based on the
feedback we collected.
2) Survey Design: To help respondents better understand-
ing the aim of our survey, we explained what is code smell
at the beginning of the survey and gave detailed definitions
and examples of the 20 code smells in related questions. We
first captured the following pieces of information to collect
demographic information about the respondents:
Demographics:
• Professional smart contract developer? : Yes / No
• Involved in open source software development? : Yes /
No
• Main role in developing smart contract.
TABLE III
SURVEY RESULTS, DISTRIBUTIONS, AND IMPACTS OF THE 20 CODE SMELLS.
Code Smell Distribution Score No. Smells Impacts Code Smell Distribution Score No. Smells Impacts
Unchecked External Calls 4.64 25 IP3 DoS Under External Influence 4.49 6 IP1
Strict Balance Equality 4.42 5 IP1 Unmatched Type Assignment 4.41 22 IP2
Transaction State Dependency 4.52 5 IP1 Reentrancy 4.70 12 IP1
Hard Code Address 4.05 84 IP3 Block Info Dependency 4.10 42 IP3
Nested Call 4.42 13 IP2 Deprecated APIs 4.12 247 IP5
Unspecified Compiler Version 3.92 533 IP5 Misleading Data Location 4.46 1 IP2
Unused Statement 4.08 10 IP5 Unmatched ERC-20 standard 4.27 45 IP4
Missing Return Statement 4.25 263 IP4 Missing Interrupter 4.0 525 IP4
Missing Reminder 4.06 27 IP4 Greedy Contract 4.21 8 IP2
High Gas Consumption Function Type 4.25 423 IP5 High Gas Consumption Data Type 4.18 0 IP5
• Experience in years
• Current country of residence
• Highest educational qualification
• Rate level of importance of 6 factors to determine profi-
ciency
Examples of Code Smells: Next, we gave detailed def-
initions and examples of the 20 code smells. We asked
respondents to rate the importance of these code smells, i.e.,
removing them can improve the security, reliability, or usabil-
ity of a project. Since some of the defined code smells are not
easy to understand, we added an option ”I don’t understand”
to ensure results are reliable. Finally, we give each question six
options (i.e., Very important, Important, Neutral, Unimportant,
Very unimportant and I don’t understand). Besides, we give
each question a textbox to enable respondents to give their
opinions.
Other Questions: We give a textbox so respondents can tell
us if they have any other comments, questions, or concerns.
3) Recruitment of Respondents: In order to get a sufficient
number of respondents from different backgrounds, we first
sent our survey to our partners who are working or study
in world-famous companies or academic institutions. Besides,
we sent our email to 989 practitioners who contribute to
open source smart contract related projects on GitHub. All
respondents could enter their email to take part in a raffle to
win two $50 Amazon gift cards.
C. Results
We received 96 responses from 24 different countries, and
we received 62 comments on our defined code smells. 74
(80.43%) of these responses involved in open source software
development efforts. The top two countries in which the
respondents reside are China (40.63%) and USA (7.29%). The
average years of experience in developing smart contracts are
1.47 years. Since the Ethereum was published in late 2015, we
believe the average year of 1.47 years can show that the re-
spondents have good experience in developing smart contracts.
Among these respondents, 60 (63.04%), 12 (13.04%), 13
(11.95%), 4 (4.35%) described their job roles as development,
testing, management and security audit respectively. The other
7 responses said they have multiple roles.
Table III shows the results of our survey. The first column
indicates each code smell and the second column illustrates the
distribution of respondents’ choice. The distribution is from
”Very unimportant” (left-most red bar) to ”Very important”
(right-most green bar). To clearly show the result, we give each
option a score and count the weighted average score which
is shown in the third column. To be specific, we give ”very
important” a score 5 and give ”very unimportant” a score 1.
We received very positive feedback from developers with
almost all code smells’ scores are larger than 4, and the
average score is 4.28. The score of ”Unspecified Compiler
Version” is 3.92 but it is also a positive score. To understand
the reasons, we reviewed comments about this smell. We found
that many developers who voted ”unimportant” mentioned
the difference among different minor versions in the same
major version (e.g., 0.4.19 and 0.4.20) is small. However, they
admitted that the difference among different major versions
(e.g., 0.4.0 and 0.5.0) is significant. Besides, some developers
gave comments that removing this code smell is very important
when they want to reuse code in the future.
Some of our smart contract code smells received negative
feedback (”Unimportant” and ”Very unimportant”). For exam-
ple, “Unspecified Compiler Version”, “Missing Interrupter”,
and “Missing Reminder” received 7,7, and 6 negative feed-
backs, respectively. For “Missing Interrupter”, some develop-
ers mentioned that adding interrupters in smart contracts will
ensure the benefits of the smart contract owners. However, the
back door mechanism may cause users to distrust contracts.
This worry makes sense, but we believe it can be fixed
if the contract owners add some insurance mechanism on
the contracts. For example, they can define rules to detect
abnormal states, and the back door mechanism can only be
executed when the abnormal state is detected. For ”Missing
Reminder”, we do not receive comments from respondents
who chose negative options. We sent emails to the developers
who gave their email address and received three feedbacks.
All mentioned that the smart contracts they developed are used
inside their companies. They will write a detailed document of
each function and when other developers in their companies
have problems, and they fix the problems face to face. There-
fore, this code smell is not important for them. However, we
believe if the smart contracts are deployed on Ethereum and
other developers can call the functions, removing this code
smell can reduce potential problems.
Some positive comments we received included:
• You provide a very good summary of some very important
security checkpoints.
• Those controls and warnings should be integrated into
the Solidity compiler, and displayed in common devel-
opment tools like Remix and Truffle.
• It is nice to have such a summary of these vulnerabil-
ities among smart contracts, I think it would be very
helpful for the blockchain practitioners as well as the
researchers.
• These suggestions above are very useful to avoid various
kinds of flaws.
• Generally speaking, all of these code smells can lead to
serious problems. I learned a lot from this survey.
V. RQ3: DISTRIBUTION AND IMPACT OF CODE SMELLS
A. Motivation
To help developers and researchers better understand the
impacts of the defined code smells, we summarized 5 impacts
and manually label 2,522 smart contracts from 587 contract
addresses to show their distribution in the real-world smart
contracts. Our labeling results provided ground truth for future
studies on smart contract code smell detection. As it is not
easy to remove all code smells due to tight project schedules
or financial reasons, the impacts and distributions of different
code smells can help developers decide which smell should
be fixed first.
B. Approach
We obtained 2,522 smart contracts from 587 real-world
Ethereum contract addresses. Two authors independently read
these smart contracts and determined whether the contracts
contained our defined code smells. Their overall Kappa value
was 0.71, which indicates substantial agreement between them.
After completing the labeling process, they discussed with
their disagreement and gave a final result. During the process
of labeling, they analyzed the impacts of each code smell and
summarized 5 common impacts. Since smart contracts in an
account cannot be separated (all public and external functions
can be called), we labeled the smart contract at the account
level.
C. Results
The defined code smells in this paper can lead to the
following five impacts, IP1 highest to IP5 lowest:
Impact 1 (IP1): The smart contracts containing the related
code smells can lead to unwanted behaviors. These bugs can be
triggered by attackers and they can make profits by controlling
sensitive functions of the contracts like transferring Ethers.
Impact 2 (IP2): The smart contracts containing the related
code smells can lead to unwanted behaviors. These can be
triggered by attackers and can result in a contract being
unable to work normally. Unlike IP1, attackers cannot control
functions to make profits.
Impact 3 (IP3): The smart contracts containing the related
code smells can lead to unwanted behaviors. Unlike IP2, these
bugs will not cause fatal problems like the crash or cannot
work again, but the contracts may lose some Ethers in some
situations.
Impact 4 (IP4): The smart contracts containing the related
code smells can work normally, but may be hard to use. When
outside programs call contracts with the smell, it may lead to
errors.
Impact 5 (IP5): The smart contracts containing the related
code smells can work normally, but the code smells can lead
to gas waste. Besides, if other smart contracts want to reuse
the code, it may lead to some mistakes due to version gaps.
Table III lists the detailed distribution of each code smell
(the fourth column) in our dataset and its related impact (the
last column). We calculate the distribution for Impacts 1 –
5 are 4.77%, 6.98%, 23.51%, 93.86%, 99.14%, respectively.
Note that one smart contract can have multiple impacts si-
multaneously. Almost all smart contracts contain at least
one code smell of the impact 4 or impact 5. Deprecated
APIS, Unspecified Compiler Version, Missing Interrupter and
High Gas Consumption Function Type are the most popular
code smells in our dataset. These code smells will not affect
the function of the contracts, but it may have unpredictable
impacts to the future. The distribution may illustrate that the
developers focus more on the functionality but do not consider
the code reuse or handle unpredictable behaviors caused by
attackers.
This finding is similar to Chen et. al [24]. They found
that 96% of smart contracts are involved no more than 5
transactions, and they are not be used anymore, indicating
that many developers do not consider the future reuse of these
contracts. We also found that ERC-20 related smart contracts
are the most popular (36.11%) in the Ethereum. However,
21.22% of them do not follow ERC-20 standards. We did not
find any smart contracts which contain High Gas Consumption
Data Type. However, since the size of our dataset is limited,
and this code smell has related posts on stack exchange. This
code smell might exist if we investigate more contracts. To
summary, our findings showed that defined code smells are
ubiquitous in real-world smart contracts.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Implications
For Researchers: Research Guidance. In this paper, we
defined 20 code smells. Several previous studies analyzed
some of them. We have investigated whether there are existing
tools that can detect some of the code smells identified by our
work. We show the results in Table IV. We first collected the
titles of papers which were published at CCS, S&P, USENIX
Security, NDSS, ACSAC, ASE, FSE, ICSE, TSE, TIFS, and
TOSEM from 2016 to 2018, since Ethereum went live on July
30, 2015 [13]. Then, we used the keywords ”smart contract”,
”Ethereum”, ”blockchain”, ”Contracts” to search for papers
which are related to the smart contract technology. After that,
we read the abstract of each paper to verify its relevance.
Finally, we found a total of 4 related papers (i.e., Oyente [33],
[18] , Zeus [30], Maian [36] and Contractfuzzer [29]). We
provide a description of these four tools in Section VII. We
find that 7 code smells can be detected by these existing tools
and most of them are security related smells. These tools focus
more on the security aspects but do not consider the other
two aspects considered as equally important by practitioners.
Therefore, researchers can pay more attention to developing
tools that can detect the other 13 code smells.
Behavior vs. Perception [26]. The belief of whether a code
smell is important or not may result in prioritizing testing
effort. The survey results and code smell distribution shown
in Table III can help us investigate whether the practitioners’
perception is consistent with their behavior. We find that the
top two most frequent code smells are ’Unspecified Compiler
Version’ and ’Missing Interrupter’ (according to the column
No. Smells in Table III). Their survey scores are also the lowest
(3.92 and 4.0 according to the column Score in Table III),
indicating that practitioners do not perceive them as important
as other smells, and thus they pay fewer attention to them
in practice which causes them to appear more than other
code smells. The appearance of these two code smells is
consistent with practitioners’ perception. However, there are
many inconsistent examples. According to the definition of
5 impacts introduced in Section 5.3, it is clear that IP1 can
cause the most serious problems compared to other impacts.
We find the ’Unchecked External Calls’ has the second highest
survey score (4.64), which shows that developers think this
smell is very important. However, its impact is only IP3, which
shows that there is an inconsistency between the practitioners’
perception (high survey score) and their behavior (low impact
to the project). Future code smell detection tools should pro-
vide rationales that explicitly describe the connection between
code smells and its impact. This could assist developers better
prioritize testing efforts, and understand the detection results
well.
Code Smells in Other Smart Contract Platforms. We propose
a method which summarizes code smells from online posts.
Our study focused on defining code smells for Ethereum
smart contracts, but the same method can be applied to other
popular blockchain platforms, e.g., EOS [6], Hyperledger [7].
These blockchain platforms also support the running of smart
contracts and have their unique features. There are thou-
sands of posts on Stack Exchange related to these platforms.
Researchers can analyze the related posts and find specific
features and code smells of these smart contract platforms.
Our work defined 20 code smells and provide a dataset which
identifies these code smells on 587 contract accounts, which
point out a new direction for future research. For example,
researchers can develop automatic code smell detection tools,
and our dataset can be used as ground truth to validate the
performance of these tools.
For Practitioners: We are the first to conduct an empirical
study by analyzing many online StackExchange posts to un-
derstand and define code smells for smart contracts, and utilize
an online survey to validate the acceptance of the defined code
smells among real-world developers. Our results showed that
most of the smart contracts in our dataset contained at least
one of the defined code smells. The results may indicate that
TABLE IV
TOOLS THAT DETECT SOME CODE SMELLS IDENTIFIED BY OUR STUDY.
Code Smells Tools
Unchecked External Calls Oyente, Zeus, Contractfuzzer
Reentrancy Oyente, Zeus, Contractfuzzer
Block Info Dependency Oyente, Zeus, Contractfuzzer
Transaction State Dependency Oyente, Zeus
DoS Under External Influence Zeus
Unmatched Type Assignment Zeus
Greedy Contract Maian
developers do not consider future use and handle unpredictable
attacks. However, since the smart contracts are immutable
to patch, the consideration of future use and unpredictable
attacks is very important. We also concluded 5 impacts of the
defined code of smells to help practitioners better understand
the consequences. The defined code smells can be regarded
as a coding guidance for practitioners when they develop
smart contracts. By removing the defined code smells, they
can develop robust and well-designed smart contracts.
Besides, developing code smell detection tools is also a
good direction to make profits. Our online survey received
many comments from managers of smart-contract-related com-
panies. Some comments are listed in Section 4.3. They showed
much interest in developing related tools and highlighted that
the related detection tools should be integrated into Solidity
compiler and development tools.
For Educators: Educators should emphasize the importance
of removing code smells before deploying smart contracts to
blockchain. A survey [23] shows that more than 20% of top
50 universities offering blockchain courses until Oct. 2018.
However, most courses focus on teaching basic grammar rule
of Solidity programming or blockchain related knowledge
but ignore other concerns (security, architecture, usability).
The distribution of the defined code smells also indicates
that many developers do not realize the importance for the
reuse of smart contracts and handling unpredictable attacks.
Educators can improve such conditions by helping students to
better understand the impacts of the code smells. Thus, it is
highly recommended that educators should pay more attention
to teaching code smell related problems for smart contract
development.
B. Threats to Validity
Internal Validity. We used keywords to filter Stack Exchange
posts. The scale of our keywords dataset determines how much
manual effort we need to pay. It is not easy to cover all
keywords, which means we may not cover all code smells.
Due to the time and human resource limitation, we defined
20 code smells in this study, but researchers can define more
code smells by using our methods. To reduce this threat, we
manually labeled 2,522 smart contracts from 587 contracts
addresses to validate the existing of these code smells. To
provide a more stable labeling process, we followed the card
sorting process, and two authors labeled the smart contracts
independently. However, it is still possible that some errors
exist in our dataset because of misunderstanding of smart
contracts.
The impact of smart contract code smells depend on our
understanding of each code smell. However, different re-
searchers and developers may have different understandings.
To minimize this threat, we read the related posts and real-
world examples and discussed with several smart contracts
developers to help improve the correctness. We also considered
feedback and comments from our survey.
It is possible that many developers have a poor understand-
ing of the defined code smells when doing our survey. To
address this, we added an option ”I don’t understand” and
removed these responses when analyzing data. Three Chinese
authors of this paper translated and reviewed the survey to
make sure the translation is correct.
External Validity. Solidity is a fast-growing programming
language. In 2018, 9 versions were updated and released [17],
which means many features may be added or removed in the
future. Ethereum can also be updated through hard fork [10].
The latest hard fork named Constantinople will happen on
the first half of 2019 [14]. Constantinople will add five
new Ethereum Improvement Proposals(EIPs) to ensure proof-
of-work more energy efficient. Some new opcodes will be
added (e.g., CREATE2) and some opcodes will be modified
(e.g., SSTORE). This means some new code smells may be
created, or existing code smells will be modified. Thousands
of new smart contracts may quickly be deployed to the
blockchain. The distribution of the code smells on real-world
smart contracts may change with new developments of smart
contract technology. Many new posts are uploaded to the Stack
Exchange, and these posts can expose new code smells. Our
method can also be applied to this situation, but it needs further
effort.
VII. RELATED WORK
A. Code Smells Detection on Centralized Software
Code smell detection has a long history. Webster [43] wrote
the first book about code smells in traditional desktop software
development. The book introduced the pitfalls of object-
oriented development to assist developers to avoid potential
problems. Object-Oriented Design Heuristics [37] defined
61 design patterns to help developers make the right design
decisions. The design patterns emphasized the relationships
between classes and objects, and these patterns help developers
write high-quality softwares. The term ”code smell” was first
introduced on a book of Beck [28]. His book defined 22
code smells and the term ”code smell” and these 22 code
smells were widely used, especially in agile development.
Mantyla [34] clarified the effects of these 22 code smells
and proposed classifications for them. Removing code smells
can improve code robustness and development efficiency.
However, decentralized apps (e.g., smart contracts) are very
different from traditional software as we introduced in section
1.
B. Bug Detection Tools of Smart Contracts
Oyente [33], [18] is the first bug detection tool of smart
contracts, which utilizes symbolic execution to detect four se-
curity issues, i.e., mishandled exception, transaction-ordering
dependence, timestamp dependence and reentrancy attack.
First, Oyente builds a skeletal control flow graph for the
input contracts. Then, they faithfully simulate EVM code
and execute the instructions to produce a set of symbolic
traces. After that, Oyente defines different patterns to check
whether the tested contracts contain the security problems or
not. Oyente measured 19,366 existing Ethereum contracts and
found 8,519 of them contain the defined security problems.
Kalra et al. [30] found many false positives and false
negatives in Oyente’s results. They developed a tool called
Zeus, an upgraded version of Oyente. Their tool feeds Solidity
source code as input and translates them to LLVM bitcode.
Zeus detects 7 security issues, 4 of them are the same as
Oyente and other 3 problems are unchecked send, Failed
send, Integer overflow/underflow. To evaluate their tool, Kalra
crawled 1524 distinct smart contracts from Etherscan [21],
Etherchain [20] and EtherCamp [19] explorers. The result
indicates about 94.6% of contracts contain at least one security
problem.
Jiang et al. [29] focus on 7 security vulnerabilities, i.e.,
Gasless Send, Exception Disorder, Reentrancy, Timestamp
Dependency, Block Number Dependency, Dangerous Dele-
gateCall and Freezing Ether. They also developed a tool
named ContractFuzzer to detect these issues. Their tool is
consisted of an offline EVM instrumentation tool and an online
fuzzing tool. Based on smart contract ABI, ContractFuzzer
can automatically generate fuzzing inputs to test the defined
security issues. They tested 6,991 smart contracts and found
that 459 of them have vulnerabilities.
Nikolic [36] et al. focus on security issues that can lead
to a contract not able to release Ethers, can transfer Ethers
to arbitrary addresses, or can be killed by anybody. Their
tool, MAIAN, takes as input data either Bytecode or source
code. MAIAN contains two major parts: symbolic analysis
and concrete validation. Like Oyente, simulates an Ethereum
Virtual Machine, utilizes symbolic execution, and defines
several execution rules to detect these security issues. Their
results were deduced from 970,898 smart contracts and found
that a total of 34,200(2,365 distinct) contracts contain at least
one of these three security issues.
We defined 20 code smells from three different aspects. The
above four papers introduce some security problems while we
focus on a broader problem coverage. We do not just focus
on security problems but help developers build better smart
contracts. We also define patterns to help developers increase
software usability and architecture.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We conducted an empirical study to understand and char-
acterize smart contract code smells. We first selected 4,141
warning related stack exchange posts from 17,128 posts.
Then we manually analyzed these posts and defined 20 smart
contract code smells from three aspects – security, architecture
and usability problems. To validate our defined code smells,
we created an online survey. The feedback from our survey in-
dicates our code smells are important and addressing them can
help developers improve the quality of their smart contracts.
We analyzed the impacts for each code smell and labeled 2,522
real-world smart contracts from 587 contract addresses.
Two groups can benefit from this study. For smart contract
developers, they can develop more robust and better-designed
smart contracts. The 5 impacts can help developers decide
the priority of removal. For software engineering researchers,
our dataset can provide ground truth for them to develop
smart contract code smell detection tools. We plan to develop
automated code smells detection tools to detect these defined
code smells. We also plan to extend our code smell list and
dataset, when more posts will be published in Stack Exchange
and, more features will be added into Solidity in the future.
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